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Tax Compliance and Delivery Methods in Rwanda 
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Summary 
 
Although field experiments in tax compliance represent a growing area of research, the 
literature has so far focussed exclusively on high and middle-income countries. This paper 
starts to fill this gap by reporting the results of a tax field experiment in Rwanda, while also 
highlighting some characteristics that may be common to other low-income countries. We 
evaluate an intervention carried out by the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA), which involved 
sending messages to taxpayers to nudge their declaration behaviour during the filing period 
of January-March 2016. Focussing particularly on business profits tax, our study is designed 
to address two interrelated questions. First, what are the key drivers of compliance in 
Rwanda? Second, what is the best delivery method to reach taxpayers with messages 
designed to improve compliance? Although other studies have explored delivery methods in 
the context of taxpayer communication, our study is the first one to interact these methods 
with different message contents. As a result, we evaluate a set of nine treatments that 
combine three message contents (deterrence, fiscal exchange, reminders) and three delivery 
methods (letters, SMS, emails) – as compared to a control group that received no message. 
We find that friendly approaches to taxpayers are generally more effective than deterrence. 
However, small taxpayers are still quite responsive to the possibility of being fined and 
prosecuted (deterrence). We also show that low-cost delivery methods like SMS and emails 
can be highly effective as compared to letters.  
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Introduction 
 
Although increasing compliance is a challenge everywhere in the world, in low-income 
countries it often presents further layers of complexity related to accountability, institutional 
capacity, and good governance. While governments need to have the necessary capacity to 
enforce tax laws, citizens may be willing to comply even when they are not forced to do so. In 
low-income countries, both these aspects – enforcement and voluntary compliance – are 
severely constrained. On the one hand, administrative constraints affecting government 
institutions range from the difficulty of recruiting and retaining skilled staff to fewer financial 
resources than high-income counterparts, limiting the extent and effectiveness of tax 
enforcement. On the other hand, low level and quality of public services, imperfect 
democratic processes, and limited access to information (e.g. tax advisers, internet 
coverage) all represent obstacles to voluntary compliance. The experimental literature on tax 
compliance has largely focused on high and middle-income countries. This paper starts filling 
this gap by reporting the results of a tax field experiment in Rwanda, while also highlighting 
some characteristics that may be common to other low-income countries. It represents the 
first wave of such work ever carried out in the African continent.1  
 
Our field experiment evaluates an intervention carried out in collaboration with the Rwanda 
Revenue Authority (RRA), which involved sending messages to taxpayers to nudge their 
declaration behaviour during the filing period of January-March 2016. Our study focuses 
particularly on declarations for corporate income tax (CIT) and personal income tax (PIT), 
although these taxpayers are usually subject to other taxes as well (e.g. Value Added Tax 
(VAT)). Building on the existing theoretical and empirical literature,2 our study is designed to 
address two interrelated questions. First, what are the key drivers of compliance in Rwanda? 
In answering this question, we compare our results with the findings available in the 
literature, while also recognising that more evidence is needed from other low-income 
countries before making further generalisations. Second, what is the best delivery method for 
reaching taxpayers when sending messages to improve compliance? Although other studies 
have explored delivery methods in the context of taxpayer communication (Ortega and 
Scartascini 2016; Doerrenberg and Schmitz 2015), our study is the first one to interact them 
with different message contents. As a result, we evaluate a set of nine treatments that 
combine three message contents (deterrence, fiscal exchange, reminders) and three delivery 
methods (letters, SMS, emails), and compare these with a control group that received no 
message. By doing this, we introduce some significant innovations into the literature, while 
relying on a research design that is largely comparable with similar studies (see Section 0).3  
 
As far as the drivers of compliance are concerned, most studies are based on the seminal 
model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) that postulates that taxpayer behaviour is the result 
of an economic calculation of the costs and benefits of evasion, similar to models in the 
tradition of the economics of crime (Becker 1968). Allingham and Sandmo’s model was later 
developed to include other factors, beyond the monetary ones related to deterrence (Erard 
and Feinstein 1994; Myles and Naylor 1996; Traxler 2010). These non-monetary factors are 
often referred to as ‘tax morale’, which is a general term encompassing peer effects, intrinsic 
motivations, culture, and fiscal exchange, amongst others.4 A growing experimental literature 
has tested the validity of such theoretical predictions in practice. On the one hand, field 
experiments have shown that deterrence can be highly effective in increasing compliance 
                                                 
1  We are aware of similar studies carried out in other African countries that, to the best of our knowledge, have not yet 
been published.  
2  Comprehensive reviews of theoretical and empirical studies on tax compliance are available in Hashimzade, Myles, and 
Tran-Nam (2013) and Mascagni (2016), respectively.  
3  More details on the design and key findings of tax experiments in the existing literature can be found in Mascagni 
(2016).  
4  For a more detailed discussion of tax morale and its components, see Luttmer and Singhal (2014).  
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(Slemrod, Blumenthal and Christian 2001; Castro and Scartascini 2015; Fellner, Sausgruber, 
and Traxler 2013; Ariel 2012; Bott, Cappelen and Sørensen 2014; Dwenger, Kleven, Raul 
and Rincke 2015). However, they also highlighted its limitations in low enforcement 
environments (Carrillo, Pomeranz and Singhal 2016), where ‘threats of audit’ cannot be 
followed up with actual checks by the revenue authority. In those cases, it may even be 
counterproductive to emphasise deterrence, because it may reinforce distrust and taxpayer 
resistance (see for example Fjeldstad and Semboja (2001)), as well as further undermining 
the credibility of the revenue administration. On the other hand, existing evidence on factors 
related to tax morale is more mixed, as some studies find that they matter for compliance 
(Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe and Vlaev 2014; Bott et al. 2014), while others fail to find an effect 
(Dwenger et al. 2015; Blumenthal, Christian and Slemrod 2001; Castro and Scartascini 2015; 
Fellner et al. 2013). The impact of tax morale also seems to be highly dependent on what 
specific aspect is highlighted in any given study, as well as prior motivations and beliefs on 
compliance (see for example Dwenger et al. 2015; Del Carpio 2014; Ali, Fjeldstad, and 
Sjursen 2015).  
 
In addition to deterrence, our experiment focuses in particular on fiscal exchange, as we 
believe it is particularly suitable and relevant in the Rwandan context (see Section 1). 
Moreover, we also include a simple reminder of the deadline for filing tax returns, which 
serves as a control message. The reminder allows us to disentangle responses to the 
contents of the message from the effect of simply receiving any message. Several studies 
have found that receiving any message from the tax authority can generate taxpayer 
responses (Del Carpio 2014; Ortega and Scartascini 2016). Therefore, failing to include a 
control message can potentially confound the results. Our experimental design allows us to 
test if deterrence is more effective than fiscal exchange to nudge taxpayers to increase 
compliance. In the case of Rwanda, we find that a friendly approach to taxpayers, including 
both information about how tax revenues are spent (fiscal exchange) and gentle reminders of 
deadlines (control message), is generally more effective than deterrence. However, and 
consistent with our expectations (see Section 1.2), our sub-group analysis shows that small 
taxpayers and PIT taxpayers, who are generally smaller than those subject to CIT, are still 
quite responsive to the possibility of being fined and prosecuted (deterrence).  
 
As regards delivery methods, the tax experiments (TE) literature has overwhelmingly used 
physical letters to communicate with taxpayers. However this method may not be efficient in 
low or middle-income countries, where communications by post are uncommon.5 For this 
reason, many field TE that use letters in these countries require the assistance of tax 
officials, who often deliver them personally to taxpayers (Mascagni et al. 2016b; Ortega and 
Scartascini 2016). Although we adopt the same solution in this study, we recognise that it 
has at least three drawbacks. First, it represents a large burden on an already overstretched 
tax administration. Second, and partly as a result of the previous point, the success of the 
delivery process may be weakened by constraints as to how much time tax officials are able 
or willing to spend in trying to deliver letters. These two issues become even more relevant 
when considering the possibility of scaling up the intervention beyond a (randomly) selected 
sample. Third, the interaction with tax officials may confound and affect the impact of letters 
on taxpayers’ behaviour. While we can partly address this issue (see Section 1.5), it is very 
difficult to fully control these interactions. Based on these practical considerations, we 
decided to experiment with other delivery methods, namely emails and SMS, which are 
cheaper and more manageable in a low-income context. However, besides these practical 
motivations, varying delivery methods also allows us to test some theoretical predictions 
regarding taxpayers’ perceived probability of detection. In particular, the model developed by 
Ortega and Scartascini (2016) postulates that taxpayers may update their perceptions on the 
probability of being caught by the tax authority, also based on the delivery method used to 
                                                 
5  For more details on the challenges and lessons learned regarding implementing tax experiments in low and middle-
income countries, see Mascagni et al. (2016b) and Castro and Scartascini (2014).  
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contact them. More costly and selective methods such as, in our case,6 the letters delivered 
by tax officials, may reveal higher enforcement effort than the cheaper emails or SMS. In 
turn, taxpayers may believe that such greater efforts are targeted at those who are 
suspected of evasion and who are therefore more likely to be subject to actual checks. Our 
results partly confirm this theoretical prediction. Based on information on the actual delivery 
status of our messages, we show that the effect of our treatment on those who received the 
messages is larger for letters than for SMS – though still smaller than for emails.7 Cheaper 
methods like SMS and emails still proved to be highly effective and they resulted in 
significant revenue gains for the RRA. Overall, we estimate that our experiment generated 
almost US$9 million as extra revenue for the RRA.  
 
The results of this study have both practical and theoretical relevance. On a practical level, 
we provide concrete policy recommendations to the RRA, and to revenue administrations in 
similar countries, on effective communication strategies to increase taxpayer compliance. 
These include both the key messages that should be highlighted and the way in which they 
are delivered. On a theoretical level, we empirically test the validity of predictions both on 
drivers of compliance and on delivery methods, in a low-income country. In doing so, we 
make two original contributions to the tax experiments literature. The first one is to expand 
this field of research to the African continent and to low-income countries more generally. 
Secondly, we combine message contents and delivery methods, in a research design that 
allows us to provide a complex but nuanced set of results. In addition, we include both 
corporations (liable to CIT) and individual companies and the self-employed (liable to PIT), 
which is one of the directions for future research encouraged by a recent review (Hallsworth 
2014).8 By including these taxpayer types, we can test whether individuals respond to our 
nudges differently than more structured organisations.  
  
                                                 
6  Note that Ortega and Scartascini (2016) used personal visits by tax officials as a delivery method. In our case, this was 
not possible due to constraints in administrative capacity and resources. However, we can still test their predictions by 
comparing letters to SMS or emails.  
7  However, the delivery status of emails is more uncertain due to a glitch in the RRA system that prevented us from 
tracing many of them (see Section 1.5).  
8  Other studies in the literature, such as Ortega and Scartascini (2016), have also included both corporations and 
individuals in their sample.  
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1  Context, experimental design, and empirical 
strategy 
 
1.1 The Rwandan context  
 
Rwanda is a small landlocked country in Eastern Africa, with a population of about 12 million 
people. After experiencing a civil war and genocide in the early 1990s, the country embarked 
on a path of development that resulted in sustained economic growth, progress on human 
and social development, and a large expansion of public services. From the tax perspective, 
Rwanda is often seen as a success story. The RRA was established in 1997 with substantial 
support from foreign donors. Since its establishment, the RRA has been collecting increasing 
amounts of tax revenue for the government’s coffers, representing about 15 per cent of GDP 
in 2014 (ATAF 2016). This figure is in line with other African and low-income countries, 
despite the absence of significant natural resources in the country. Moreover, as compared 
to other African countries, Rwanda collects proportionally more income taxes – about a third 
of total revenue (Mascagni et al.  2016a; ATAF 2016). However, descriptive evidence 
(Mascagni et al. 2016a) suggests that in Rwanda non-compliance is a larger issue for 
income taxes than for Value Added Tax (VAT) or Pay As You Earn (PAYE) taxes, thus 
making it relevant to focus on those. Income taxes are typically seen as hard to collect and 
often represent a minor share of total revenue in many low-income countries, as opposed to 
the major role they play in high-income countries’ budgets (Besley and Persson 2013).  
 
In spite of its success, the RRA faces many challenges that are common to revenue 
administrations in other low-income countries as well. The informal sector represents about 
40 per cent of national income,9 meaning that many operate completely outside the tax net. 
By using administrative data, these fully informal actors are excluded from our analysis. 
Amongst those who are registered with the RRA, the level of evasion and avoidance is still 
expected to be relatively high, although these phenomena are typically hard to measure. For 
example, a sizeable proportion of taxpayers file tax declarations indicating zero turnover. 
Although this behaviour seems puzzling, there are at least two possible explanations. The 
first one is that this is a way to avoid fines for non-filing while still managing to avoid paying 
any income tax (Mascagni et al. 2016a; Mascagni and Mengistu 2016). The second one is 
that processes for de-registration are so complex that taxpayers prefer to remain registered 
and keep filing nil returns. Like some other countries in Africa, Rwanda still experiences 
some shortcomings related to good governance and democracy, although public institutions 
in the country present a high degree of internal accountability and are seen to be more 
efficient than in other countries (Curtis 2015). The RRA is a good example of this, as it is 
widely regarded as one of the most professional revenue authorities on the continent. In 
addition to a strong revenue performance, the RRA has also fully embraced the principles of 
modern tax administration – recognising the importance of a customer-oriented approach 
based on professionalism and the sensitisation and education of taxpayers, rather than on 
aggressive enforcement alone. In this context, the RRA adopts a number of measures to 
facilitate filing and compliance more generally. Amongst others, since 2012 taxpayers can file 
their returns online thanks to a new e-tax system, while micro taxpayers can even file using a 
mobile platform. In addition, presumptive regimes (‘flat amount’ and ‘lump sum’) are available 
for small taxpayers to facilitate filing and record-keeping, which would be more complex 
under the ‘real regime’.10  
 
These characteristics represent an advantage for our study, because tax field experiments 
require a high degree of commitment and engagement by the local revenue administration. 
                                                 
9  This figure is reported in Schneider and Williams 2013 and it represents an average value between 1999 and 2006.  
10  For more information on these regimes, see Mascagni et al. 2016a.  
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The Rwandan context also provides an ideal setting to test the effect of friendly approaches 
to tax compliance, which are fully in line with RRA’s current strategy. At the same time, the 
RRA may be special in many respects and may not be fully representative of the average tax 
administration in Africa. This calls for caution when trying to generalise our results to other 
low-income countries. Still, the RRA is not a unique case of a successful revenue authority in 
the continent (ATAF 2016). 
 
In terms of public services, Rwanda has achieved almost full coverage of health and 
education at highly subsidised prices. For example, health insurance covers 91 per cent of 
the population, which constitutes the highest share in Africa (The Economist 2016).11 
Although the majority of the government budget is financed by taxes, foreign aid still 
contributes substantially to the public purse: about 30-40 per cent of the budget.12 A recent 
dispute with donors in 2010 reinforced the government’s rhetoric of self-reliance that 
highlights the importance of the country being independent from foreign donors and of being 
able to ‘stand on its own feet’. In this context, the Government of Rwanda has been 
highlighting its recognition of taxpayers as key contributors to the country’s sustainable 
development, for example through taxpayer appreciation days, and it has even created a 
fund for voluntary contributions that all citizens can make to finance public investment and 
the development strategy more generally.  
 
1.2 Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
 
As highlighted in the introduction, our analysis explores two broad hypotheses related to the 
drivers of compliance and delivery methods. As far as the former is concerned, motivations 
to comply can be broadly divided in monetary (often related to deterrence) and non-monetary 
(related to tax morale). Although we build on an extensive theoretical literature on the drivers 
of tax compliance, we do not review it here in any detail, because it would be outside the 
scope of this paper (for a good review, see for example Hashimzade, Myles and Tran-Nam 
2013). We are particularly interested in testing whether the empirical finding that deterrence 
is highly effective in high and middle-income countries is also valid in low-income countries, 
where enforcement levels and state capacity is generally lower. The literature has shown that 
lower institutional capacity can severely limit the effectiveness of standard prescriptions to 
increase tax compliance. For example, Carrillo, Pomeranz, and Singhal (2016) show that, 
although the use of third-party information to monitor firms’ turnover results in an increase in 
declared income, such increases are accompanied by higher reported costs. By doing this, 
firms can maintain a similar level of profit and therefore of tax. In these cases, real change in 
compliance behaviour can only be obtained by following up on the discrepancies highlighted 
by third-party information with traditional audits, which can allow the revenue authority to 
monitor less observable margins. In the case of Rwanda, like many other low-income 
countries, third-party information13 is rarely used and traditional enforcement is severely 
limited, with very few audits being carried out each year.14 In this context, taxpayers may 
take deterrence messages less seriously and therefore respond less or not at all. On the 
other hand, they may be more responsive to non-monetary drivers of tax compliance. 
Although we would have ideally tested more than just one element of tax morale, this was 
not possible due to an already large number of treatments and a limited sample size (see 
Section 1.4).15 Therefore, we decided to focus on fiscal exchange, because it seems to fit the 
                                                 
11  Rwanda has been successful in tackling diseases that are frequent and deadly but cheap to treat (e.g. diarrhoea). 
However, the country still faces considerable challenges to treat chronic diseases (e.g. heart disease or cancer), which 
occur more often as life expectancy is rising (The Economist 2016). 
12  As reported by the World Bank: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview (accessed 5 January 2017).  
13  Here we refer to third-party information coming, for example, from banks or other institutions and not to the third-party 
reporting that occurs in the case of PAYE.  
14  The RRA only carries out a very limited number of formal audits each year. For example, in 2015-16 it audited less than 
300 taxpayers (Mascagni et al. 2016b).  
15  For example, several studies in the literature have looked at peer effects, using messages highlighting that most pay 
their taxes on time and/or in full (Hallsworth et al. 2014; Blumenthal et al. 2001; Castro and Scartascini 2015). By doing 
this, they are meant to encourage taxpayers to join the compliant majority and perhaps elicit feelings of shame for being 
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Rwandan context particularly well, including the current rhetoric on self-reliance and the 
government’s efforts to expand service delivery (see Section 1.1). Using messages on 
deterrence and fiscal exchange, as well as a simple reminder, we therefore test the following 
hypothesis: 
 
HP1: Fiscal exchange is the most effective content, amongst the ones considered, to nudge 
taxpayers in Rwanda to comply more.  
 
To explore this hypothesis (and others) in more detail, we test it separately for relevant sub-
groups (see Section 1.6). We are especially interested to explore differences in taxpayers’ 
reactions to various contents across the size distribution. In particular, small taxpayers in 
Rwanda differ from large ones in at least two dimensions that are relevant to our study. First, 
they have much less access to information on the tax system, due to the shortage of good 
tax advisors and to limited resources they can dedicate to tasks related to taxpaying. In low-
income countries, this often results in higher compliance costs and even larger tax burdens 
than large taxpayers (Coolidge 2012; Yesegat, Vorontsov, Coolidge and Corthay 2015; 
Mascagni and Mengistu 2016). Second, it is very unlikely for the RRA to get in touch with 
small taxpayers with formal audits or even informal checks (Mascagni et al. 2016a). This is 
likely to result in a low perceived probability of detection, which may be corrected upwards 
(with a compliance effect) as a response to any personalised message from the tax authority, 
and particularly to letters. Deterrence messages may be particularly threatening to small 
taxpayers, who may feel they cannot afford to pay fines or engage in burdensome audit 
procedures. Instead, large taxpayers are less likely to respond to those messages, as they 
already know how to plan their tax affairs to their advantage. In fact deterrence messages in 
these cases can even backfire (Slemrod et al. 2001; Ariel 2012). Therefore, we would expect 
a larger response to deterrence in the sub-groups of small and PIT taxpayers (the latter 
being smaller than those subject to CIT).  
 
Furthermore, the three message contents (see Table 1) were interacted with three delivery 
methods: physical letters, emails and SMS. In other words, each message content was 
delivered using each method, making a total of nine treatments. Therefore, we can test a 
second hypothesis that is related to delivery methods and how they affect the perceived 
probability of detection. Based on the theoretical predictions of Ortega and Scartascini 
(2016), we would expect taxpayers to react more to the letters than to other delivery 
methods. This hypothesis can be expressed as follows.  
 
HP2: Physical letters generate the largest increase in compliance, amongst the delivery 
methods tested in Rwanda.  
 
The reason for this expectation is that letters reveal a higher effort by the revenue authority, 
primarily because of the engagement of tax officials in delivering letters. Since this delivery 
method is more expensive than others, rational taxpayers may expect the revenue authority 
to use it particularly in cases where it expects large returns from uncovering previously 
undeclared income. As a result, their perceived probability of detection would increase and 
they would be more likely to respond to the letter. This theoretical framework is indeed in line 
with the practice of revenue administration in Rwanda. For example, audits are based on risk 
rather than allocated randomly, as the limited resources available need to be used in a 
targeted manner. Due to limited resources, the probability of an audit is indeed related to the 
fact of being visited. Moreover, anecdotal evidence shows that many taxpayers do not realise 
they are on the RRA’s radar, even if they are registered (Mukama, Karangwa, and 
Hakizimana 2016). In this context, receiving a letter from a tax official can be quite an 
exceptional event. Therefore, we hypothesise that letters would trigger a greater reaction 
                                                                                                                                                        
part of a small minority of evaders. However, non-compliance rates in low-income countries are quite high, and thus 
communicating them may backfire and generate the opposite effect. If the compliance rate revealed in the message is 
lower than previously thought, then taxpayers may actually comply less than before. 
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than SMS, which are used more routinely by the RRA for communication campaigns. 
Similarly to the previous hypothesis, we also test the validity of HP2 on various relevant sub-
groups (see Section 1.6).  
 
Finally, by combining contents and methods, we can also test more detailed hypotheses 
about the interaction between the two. For example, the deterrence message paired with the 
letter delivery method may generate a particularly large response if the channel is the 
increased probability of audit, since both aspects would contribute to increasing such 
probability. Although we test all the nine specific combinations, we do not postulate specific 
theoretical predictions a priori on such interactions.  
 
1.3 Research design 
 
Based on the conceptual framework set out in the previous section, we use nine treatments 
to test our two broad hypotheses. These treatments interact three message contents 
(deterrence, fiscal exchange, reminder) and three delivery methods (letter, email, SMS), and 
they are compared to a control group that received no message. It is worth noting at the 
outset that our treatments do not vary actual parameters of the tax system, such as the 
actual probability of being audited or the level of public services. Instead, they aim to provide 
information and affect perceptions about deterrence and fiscal exchange. Table 1 
summarises the details of message contents. As far as emails and letters are concerned, the 
treatment messages (with related pictures16 and subject lines) were added to otherwise 
identical letters/emails that started with a reminder of deadlines (as in row 1, column 3 of 
Table 1) and ended with a line to thank taxpayers and wish them well. The text messages 
necessarily had to be slightly different. They did not include pictures and were shorter due to 
character limits.17 However, to preserve some comparability, the body of the text messages 
aimed to concisely combine the body and subject line of the emails and letters (columns 2 
and 3 in Table 1). The complete text of emails, letters and text messages is reported in 
Appendix 1.  
  
                                                 
16  The picture of the gavel used for the deterrence message was also used in Castro and Scartascini (2015). 
17  The main body of the SMS was limited to 140 characters and the name of the taxpayer was limited to 15 characters. 
Taxpayers with longer names were abbreviated automatically after the 14th character. 
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Table 1 Summary of treatment messages’ contents  
 
Treatment Subject line Message Image 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reminder  Tax filing period 
open until 31st March 
2016 
RRA would like to inform you that 
you can file your tax return until 31st 
March 2016. For more information 
about the filing process and 
payment methods, contact the call 
centre (3004) or visit the RRA 
website (www.rra.gov.rw).    
 
 
 
 
No image 
Deterrence  Pay your taxes on 
time and avoid fines 
and penalties 
Reminder as above, plus:  
 
Do you know that if you do not 
declare and pay your taxes on time, 
RRA can fine and possibly 
prosecute you?  
Pay your taxes on time and avoid 
fines and penalties.  
 
 
 
 
Fiscal 
exchange 
Pay taxes. Build 
Rwanda. Be proud.  
Reminder as above, plus: 
 
By paying your taxes you make it 
possible to educate our children, 
fund our healthcare, and keep us 
safe. 
Pay taxes. Build Rwanda. Be proud.  
 
 
Control group 
 
No message No message No message 
 
In line with the best practice in behavioural economics (BIT 2012) and in the empirical tax 
experiments literature (Hallsworth 2014; Mascagni 2016), all messages were addressed to 
taxpayers using their names and were simple and concise – five short sentences at most. To 
maximise reach and facilitate understanding, our messages were translated in two 
languages: English and Kinyarwanda.18  
 
The contents, including the general message and the specific phrasing, were developed in 
close collaboration with the RRA to make sure that they were both relevant to the Rwandan 
context and in line with existing laws, regulations, and practices. The RRA implemented the 
whole intervention in full accordance with their normal procedures. All letters and emails 
were signed by the Deputy Commissioner General and letters were validated by the official 
RRA stamp and letterhead. While SMS and emails were sent through the official RRA 
platform, letters were delivered personally by tax officials. In this way we kept our study as 
aligned as possible with a standard taxpaying situation where the RRA is the main interface 
for taxpayers, who were not informed of the existence of this study. Even within the RRA, we 
kept the research project highly confidential with information restricted to a few key people, to 
minimise the risk of spreading the information about the study. If taxpayers had thought that 
letters were simply part of a study, they might have been less encouraged to respond. 
Instead, this intervention was a real pilot communication strategy of the RRA, which was then 
evaluated as part of this study. Although we cannot know with certainty whether the 
information spread beyond the core RRA team, we received several reassurances on 
confidentiality and we did not receive any report of leakage of information about the study.  
                                                 
18  In emails, the two translations appeared one right after the other, while in the case of letters they were displayed on the 
same page. For SMS, the RRA sent two separate messages in the two languages right after each other. In the pilot 
experiment (Mascagni et al. 2016b), we translated messages into three languages: English, French and Kinyarwanda. 
However, in consultation with the RRA, we have decided to drop French in this experiment.  
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Emails and letters are fully comparable, based on the contents summarised in Table 1, 
except for the delivery method. They were both sent at the same time in early February 
2016. On the other hand, SMS are different from emails and letters in more than one respect. 
In addition to being shorter and without images, we also sent the same SMS twice to 
taxpayers allocated in the relevant groups: once in early February and once in mid-March. 
The main rationale is that we expected SMS to be less tangible than emails and letters in 
particular, so that sending them twice may maximise their impact.19  
 
1.4 Data and randomisation  
 
Our administrative dataset contains anonymised taxpayer-level information that the RRA 
collects when it receives CIT and PIT declarations. It is worth noting that in Rwanda both 
these tax types are applicable to businesses, although the businesses may be of different 
types. While CIT declarations are filed by incorporated firms, PIT taxpayers are individual 
businesses or the self-employed. The latter are usually smaller, have a less institutionalised 
structure (or none at all), and are typically highly reliant on one individual.20 Our sample 
therefore excludes those taxpayers who only receive employment income, which is subject to 
Pay As You Earn taxes (PAYE) that are usually withheld by the employer. As opposed to 
PAYE, incomes subject to PIT and CIT have to be self-declared by taxpayers – therefore 
offering a greater opportunity for non-compliance (Slemrod et al. 2001; Kleven, Knudsen, 
Kreiner, Pederson and Saez 2011). Consequently, taxpayers in our sample are likely to have 
some margin to increase their compliance and therefore to respond to our nudges. A 
companion study based on the same administrative data from Rwanda shows that the 
compliance gap is indeed larger for these tax types than for VAT and PAYE (Mascagni et al. 
2016a), thus justifying our focus on these tax types.  
 
The RRA administrative dataset available to us spans from the fiscal years 2012 to 2015 and 
includes the full population of taxpayers. We used 2014 as the baseline year to randomly 
allocate them to treatment groups and 2015 to observe outcomes after the intervention.21 
The dataset includes primarily financial variables, such as turnover, gross profits, and tax 
liability. In addition, we know the tax centre where the taxpayer is registered, the 
geographical area where the business operates, and the sector of activity – although the 
latter variable is considered unreliable.22 Our outcome variable is the tax liability (henceforth, 
just ‘tax’) that results from the declaration. Tax, defined as such, includes the whole liability 
regardless of whether the actual payment happens through withholding procedures, tax 
credits, or actual payments. Using tax instead of income as an outcome variable allows us to 
look at the overall response to our treatments, including both potential changes in declared 
income and costs (see Carrillo et al. 2016 and Section 1.2).  
 
The information needed to contact taxpayers is included in the RRA’s taxpayer registry. 
However, like in many other low-income countries, the taxpayer registry in Rwanda is often 
incomplete and out-dated, presenting an obvious challenge in reaching taxpayers based on 
the information contained there. Since this issue was identified as a key challenge in the pilot 
study for this experiment (Mascagni et al. 2016b),23 we could take it into account at the 
research design stage. Our pragmatic solution to this challenge was to restrict the sample in 
                                                 
19  In the remainder of this paper, we will use the short ‘SMS’ instead of ‘SMS sent twice’, even if all SMS were indeed sent 
twice during the filing period.  
20  Note that this means that, for PIT, the individual who owns the firm would normally be the person who is receiving the 
message. In contrast, for CIT, it could be either the owner/CEO (especially for small companies) or the accountant (for 
larger companies).  
21  Data for 2015 contains information from declarations filed between 1 January and 31 March 2016, when our intervention 
occurred, and refers to the tax year January-December 2015.  
22  At the time of this study, the RRA was in the process of reorganising the sector information in the taxpayer registry.  
23  Note that a small number of taxpayers who were part of the pilot are also included in this experiment. However, those 
who participated in the pilot experiment are evenly distributed across treatment groups. Moreover, the exclusion of 
these taxpayers from the econometric analysis did not influence our findings.  
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two ways. First, we only considered taxpayers who are registered in the Province of Kigali 
and who had recently filed a PIT or CIT tax return.24 Second, we selected those taxpayers 
that are more likely to have updated contact information in the taxpayer registry. Therefore, 
to be eligible for inclusion in our experiment, taxpayers had to fulfil one of the following two 
conditions: 1) to have registered with the RRA in 2013 or 2014;25 or 2) to be registered for 
the e-tax system. At the time of registration, both with the RRA and with the e-tax system, 
taxpayers are required to confirm their contact details. As a result, this restricted sample 
minimises the possibility of having absent or outdated contact details, as these would have 
been provided within a couple of years prior to our intervention. Still, even after restricting the 
sample according to these conditions, we could only include those taxpayers for whom 
contact details were available. Eventually, we included 79 per cent of the registered CIT and 
14 per cent of the PIT filers in Kigali. Since only a relatively small number of PIT taxpayers 
had all the necessary contact information, we only used SMS for PIT taxpayers as the phone 
number seemed to be the information available most frequently. As far as CIT taxpayers are 
concerned, the sample size was instead sufficient to test all nine treatments.26 We report 
power calculations in Appendix 4. 
 
Since our sample was necessarily constrained by the availability of contact information, we 
can only consider a selected group of taxpayers. More specifically, taxpayers in our sample 
are relatively larger and, relatedly, pay relatively more tax than the broader population of 
taxpayers. This selection implies two limitations. The first one is that we cannot argue that we 
would obtain the same results if we were to scale up the intervention to the entire population 
of taxpayers, since ours is a selected sample. However, until the tax registry is fully updated 
(an effort to do so is underway at the RRA), a full scale-up will not be feasible. In this study 
we are more interested in testing the concept27 that nudges can work in a low-income context 
to increase compliance – and to find out how, using the hypotheses described in Section 1.2. 
The second limitation is that we can only test the full set of treatments for incorporated 
businesses that file CIT returns. For PIT taxpayers, we are unable to test the hypothesis on 
delivery methods (HP2).  
 
Based on this sample, each taxpayer was assigned to one of the ten groups (nine treatments 
plus one control) based on stratified randomisation. In line with the best practice on 
randomised evaluations,28 we decided to stratify to achieve balance, maximise statistical 
power, and allow sub-group analysis. After consultation with the RRA, we chose two 
variables as strata, both of which are discrete and expected to be highly related to the 
outcome. The first stratum divides taxpayers by regime type. About 55 per cent of the 
taxpayers in the CIT sample were subject to the stricter reporting requirements of the real 
regime (see Section 1.1), while the same figure is 22 per cent for PIT. The second stratum 
identifies ‘zero-tax’ filers (see Section 1.1), which captures respectively 53 per cent and 28 
per cent of CIT and PIT taxpayers.29 Although we did not use size as a stratum, we check the 
balance between treatment groups before performing sub-group analysis based on size in 
Section 2. Our randomisation was successful in statistical terms (p-values always higher than 
5 per cent), as confirmed in the balance tests reported in Appendix 2.  
                                                 
24  Most of the taxpayers included in our sample had filed in 2014, the year prior to our intervention. However, to increase 
sample size, we also included some CIT taxpayers who filed in 2013 (about 5 per cent of the CIT sample), as well as 
PIT taxpayers who had last filed in 2012 (2 per cent of the PIT sample) and 2013 (12 per cent of the PIT sample) 
respectively. Note that although we include these taxpayers in the randomisation, some of them did not file in 2015, or 
in 2014, and are therefore excluded from the analysis (see Section 1.5). Regarding the restriction of the sample to 
registrations in Kigali, see Mascagni et al. 2016b.  
25  Taxpayers who registered at the RRA for the years 2013 and 2014 may have already been active taxpayers before 
these years, but they updated their registration details in 2013 or 2014.  
26  To make sure all our treatment cells were comparable, we selected the sample so that everyone needed to have all 
contact information (address, phone, email) to be eligible, regardless of what delivery method they would be assigned 
to.  
27  See Glennester and Takavarasha 2013: 91.  
28  For example, see Glennester and Takavarasha 2013.  
29  The lower number of zero-tax filers in the PIT sample is due to the higher proportion of taxpayers in the lump-sum and 
flat amount regimes, which require taxpayers to make a positive tax payment (Mascagni et al. 2016a).  
17 
 
 
1.5 Implementation  
 
Before the implementation of the intervention we briefed all tax officials who were involved in 
the delivery of letters, as well as the call centre, and the heads of key departments such as 
audit and taxpayer services. For those who knew about the study, the briefing stressed the 
importance of keeping the research confidential and of directing all potential taxpayer 
enquiries to the standard RRA channel, the call centre. Officials working at the call centre 
were informed that the letters aimed to provide information to taxpayers and did not imply an 
upcoming audit. We also encouraged call centre officials to collect information about 
taxpayer enquiries regarding the messages, although this proved quite challenging.30 
Officials involved in the delivery of messages were instructed to collect information about the 
actual delivery of the messages, in the form of a return slip for letters or a delivery report for 
SMS and emails.  
 
The RRA sent messages to all selected taxpayers during the filing period between 1 January 
and 31 March 2016, when they had to file their declarations for the fiscal year 2015. Initially, 
we planned to send out the emails, letters, and the first round of text messages at the 
beginning of January 2016. However, due to unforeseen delays, all messages were 
eventually delivered in the first week of February 2016. The second round of text messages 
was sent in mid-March, two weeks before the deadline.  
 
We received delivery reports for most SMS and letters, showing delivery rates of about 97 
per cent for SMS31 and 53 per cent for letters.32 Although the compliance rate for the latter is 
relatively low, it generates a sufficient difference in exposure between our treatment and 
control groups. As far as emails are concerned, a glitch in the RRA server means that we 
cannot be sure about the delivery to many taxpayers in these treatments. Although the RRA 
received a failed delivery message from roughly 39 per cent of the email sample, at least five 
of these taxpayers responded to the messages. This could indicate that at least some of the 
messages were delivered at a later stage, potentially with some delay. In addition, we do not 
have information about the delivery status of another 50 per cent of the email sample.  
 
Although most taxpayers filed in the second half of the taxpaying period, about 3 per cent of 
our CIT sample33 had already filed by the time they received our treatment message on 1 
February. In addition, another 13 per cent of our CIT sample failed to file by the deadline of 
31 March. These taxpayers may have declared later or may not declare at all. The 
comparable figures for PIT are 10.5 per cent for early filing and 21 per cent for late or non-
filing.34 As a result, around 84 and 69 per cent respectively of our CIT and PIT samples 
declared for 2015 between 1 February 2016 and 1 April 2016.35 This is relevant to our 
                                                 
30  For more details on this and other challenges we encountered in the implementation of the experiment, see the report 
on the pilot to this study (Mascagni et al. 2016b) and the summary of taxpayer feedback (Mukama et al. 2017).  
31  This refers to the numbers of SMS successfully delivered in the second round, although we cannot infer the messages 
were actually read. Due to a glitch in the RRA system, we did not receive delivery reports for the first round of SMS.  
32  The share of delivered letters using the control and the public service message are very similar (delivery rate of 56 and 
57 per cent, respectively). However, the number of delivered deterrence messages is considerably lower (success rate 
47 per cent). These differences were unexpected and are puzzling to us and to the RRA, because the auditors, who 
were responsible for the letter delivery, did not know whether they delivered a deterrence message or not (since the 
letters were sealed in envelopes). Order effects in the delivery process may partially explain the different success rates 
in the letter delivery process (e.g. the letters could have been handed over to auditors in the order they were printed and 
the auditors may have stopped all delivery attempts after some days).  
33  These firms are mainly subject to the flat and lump-sum regimes (65 per cent out of these 291), which face less 
stringent bookkeeping requirements.  
34  The relatively higher number of early PIT declarations is largely due to the relatively higher share of PIT filers in the flat 
and lump-sum regimes (94 per cent of the 293 early filers are in the flat or lump-sum regimes). 
35  The official filing period ended on 31 March 2016. However, there were long queues at the RRA headquarters and 
computer servers were temporarily down on 31 March 2016. As a result, several taxpayers were only able to file on the 
next day, 1 April 2016 (indeed 59 taxpayers filed on 1 April, while only three more filed on 2 April). While this paper 
includes filings on 1 April 2016 in its analysis, the results are almost identical and the main findings do not change if we 
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analysis because these taxpayers constitute the relevant sample for our statistical 
estimations. Importantly, using Fisher’s tests, we do not find statistical differences in the 
likelihood of having declared after our experimental intervention across the CIT and PIT, 
respectively, control and treatments groups. Therefore, the delayed implementation did not 
have an impact on the balance of our randomisation.  
 
1.6 Empirical strategy  
 
To estimate the treatment effects, we use the following equation:  
 
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑖 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑖
9
𝑗=1
+  γ𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖, 
 
where i indicates the taxpayer and j is an index for the treatments, nine for the CIT sample 
and only three for the PIT sample. X is a vector of taxpayer characteristics, such as a binary 
variable indicating whether a firm is large (according to registration of the taxpayer at the 
RRA’s large or top-medium taxpayers’ office), binary variables for the geographical 
location,36 a binary variable identifying zero-tax filers in the previous year, lagged gross profit, 
and an interaction variable between the latter two variables.37 The dependent variable is the 
CIT or PIT tax liability, depending on the sample used, as reported in tax declarations relative 
to the financial year 2015. All monetary variables are expressed in Rwandan francs (RWF).38 
For a description of the variables used in our regressions, see Table 8 in Appendix 3.  
 
As mentioned in Sections 1.1 and 1.4, many taxpayers in our sample have a tax liability 
equal to zero, either because they declare a turnover of zero or because they declare losses 
instead of profits. Therefore, our dependent variable is effectively censored at zero. 
Intuitively, one could think about the ‘willingness to pay tax’ as a latent variable (which can be 
negative), while we can only observe the actual tax liability that is strictly equal to or greater 
than zero.39 Regardless of how much taxpayers may dislike paying taxes, the minimum they 
can pay is zero. Similarly, regardless of how much they under-declare their income, the 
minimum tax liability they can achieve would always be zero. In this situation, using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) on our sample would lead to inconsistent estimates. To solve this 
problem, we estimate the equation above with two models. The first one is a standard OLS, 
which however we estimate on a sample that excludes zero-tax filers in the baseline. As a 
consequence of using zero-tax filers in our stratification, this sub-sample is still balanced 
across treatments. Second, we estimate our equation with a tobit model, using the full 
sample. The tobit model is especially suited to censored data and it has been used in other 
studies in the tax experiments literature, for the same reason that motivates us to adopt it 
here (Slemrod and Weber 2012; Alm and McClellan 2012; Alm, Cherry, Jones and McKee 
2010; Coricelli, Joffily, Montmarquette and Villeval 2007). However, it is particularly sensitive 
to deviations from the assumptions of normality of the error. Whenever this assumption is not 
                                                                                                                                                        
only consider filings by 31 March 2016. Results using the original filing deadline are available from the authors upon 
request. 
36  The majority of taxpayers are located in three districts: Nyarugenge, Kicukiro, and Gasabo. We include dummies for the 
first two, while we omit the latter to avoid collinearity.  
37  Lagged gross profit is only available for firms in the real regime and is assumed to be zero for firms who are not in the 
real regime. Therefore, the variable also reflects membership of the real regime. In our randomisation, we used zero tax 
due and the real regime to determine the strata. As we include gross profit, a variable for zero tax due as well as its 
interaction effect, all randomisation strata are reflected in our regression analysis. We do not include lagged tax due and 
zero tax due into the same equation because of collinearity. In contrast, we are able to include gross profit and the zero 
tax due dummy in the same equation, as there are taxpayers with zero tax due but non-zero lagged gross profit. 
Nevertheless, to test the sensitivity of our results, Table 14 and Table 16 in Appendix 6 will show the results if our 
regressions additionally include a control for lagged tax due.  
38  A log transformation did not provide a better fit for our model, therefore we have decided to keep the variables in levels.  
39  Although negative taxes exist in the literature, they often refer to transfers, which are not considered in our analysis of 
corporate and personal income taxes.  
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satisfied, we also present a two-part tobit model, which maintains consistency of the 
estimator even when normality is violated (Cameron and Trivedi 2010).   
 
Particularly in a small country like Rwanda, it is possible that taxpayers talk to others in their 
network about our treatment messages, therefore potentially generating spillover effects. 
Although most tax experiments in the literature do not take spillovers explicitly into account 
(Mascagni 2016), recent studies have shown that they can be sizeable (Drago, Mengel, and 
Traxler 2015; Carrillo, Castro, and Scartascini 2016). Although we do not formally consider 
spillovers across firms, we use cluster-corrected standard errors based on districts.40 As 
such, our errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and allow for correlation of observations 
within districts. However, this is only a very imperfect and partial solution to the problem of 
spillovers.41 The major drawback of using cluster-standard errors is that they have a 
tendency to over-reject the null hypothesis if the number of clusters is relatively small (i.e. the 
actual size of the test is higher than suggested by the standard t and F statistics). 
Consequently, there could be a tendency to find too many significant treatment effects, even 
if the effects actually only occur by chance. To tackle this issue, we use a small cluster 
correction based on a T distribution with G-L degrees of freedom, where G is the number of 
clusters and L the number of coefficients (Bell and McCaffrey 2002; Cameron and Miller 
2015).  
 
We estimate the treatment effects both based on the original assignment to the treatments 
(intention-to-treat, or ITT) and on the information described in Section 1.5 on whether 
taxpayers actually received our letters (local average treatment effects, or LATE). On the one 
hand, ITT estimates are particularly relevant when providing policy recommendations, since 
they reflect the fact that treatments cannot be mandated (Bloom 2008) – that is, the RRA 
cannot force taxpayers to receive and read our messages. ITT provides the expected effect 
of an intervention taking into account that some messages will not be delivered. On the other 
land, LATE shows the estimated treatment effect on the compliers (the group of taxpayers 
who received the messages), using the treatment assignment as an instrumental variable 
(IV) for the actual treatment. It therefore provides an indication of the effectiveness of the 
intervention on those who effectively received the treatment. In addition, it also allows us to 
compare treatments that may differ in terms of delivery rates. This is particularly relevant to 
making comparisons across delivery methods, as we had a considerably higher share of 
delivered messages for SMS than for letter and email. With LATE, we can infer whether any 
difference in the effects of these delivery methods is due to the different delivery rates or to 
an actual difference in effectiveness. In our LATE analysis, we conservatively assume that 
both the emails that got lost from the server and the emails with returned delivery failure 
notifications were delivered.42  
 
Finally, we perform the analysis across three sets of sub-groups of our overall sample. The 
first one distinguishes individual businesses that pay PIT from corporations that are subject 
to CIT. The second one looks more specifically at zero-tax filers, who are a sizeable 
proportion of our sample. The third one divides taxpayers into two groups based on size: the 
largest 10 per cent and the remaining 90 per cent. This distinction is relevant because the 
                                                 
40  While most of the taxpayers are from three districts in Kigali (Gasabo, Kicukiro, and Nyarugenge), our sample includes 
CIT filers from 26 different districts. We cluster on districts rather than sector location (i.e. the administrative level below 
districts in Rwanda: e.g. the sector Kiyovu is part of the district Gasabo), because the literature on cluster-robust 
standard errors generally recommends to cluster on the highest available cluster level (see Cameron and Miller 2015 for 
an overview). While the main conclusions of this study are generally only mildly affected if we cluster on sector location 
instead of districts, the control letter loses its statistical significance if we cluster on sectors (compare to results of Table 
2: ITT results for CIT sample in Section 2.1). Results using clustering on sectors are available from the authors upon 
request. 
41  Ideally, our design would have considered spillovers more explicitly by randomising both across and within clusters (e.g. 
including entire districts in which everyone is part of a certain treatment group and otherwise). In our case, we would 
have faced several difficulties in trying to implement such a design, including a limited sample size, the concentration of 
taxpayers in urban areas, and imprecise information on addresses. 
42  Therefore, we consider that 87 per cent of taxpayers received the public service email, 99 per cent the deterrence email 
and 83 per cent the reminder email. 
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largest 10 per cent of taxpayers in Rwanda, as in most low income countries, contribute the 
largest share of tax revenues (Mascagni et al. 2016a). The first two sets of sub-groups were 
taken into account in our randomisation, and are therefore balanced by design. The third one 
was not a stratum, but the resulting sub-groups are balanced nonetheless,43 therefore 
allowing the sub-group analysis of treatment effects. Due to the larger sample size, we report 
results for the zero-tax and size sub-groups only for the CIT sample.   
 
2  Results  
 
2.1 CIT results 
 
Table 2 shows the intention-to-treat estimation including all taxpayers who declared for 2015 
after 1 February 2016 and by 1 April 2016. All treatment effects in the table are to be 
interpreted relative to the control group. In addition to the effects of all nine treatments, the 
table also reports results for pooled treatments by content and by delivery methods. Column 
1 estimates a tobit model including all CIT filers in our sample. Since the assumption of 
normality of the error term for this model is rejected, we also estimate a two-part tobit model 
in columns 2 and 3. Column 2 reports the first part, a probit model including the full sample 
and explaining the binary decision of being a ‘zero-tax’ filer. Column 3 reports the second 
part, an OLS restricted to those taxpayers who have a positive tax liability in 2015. Finally, 
column 4 reports the results for the sub-group of taxpayers with zero CIT due in the baseline 
and is based on OLS estimates, since censoring in this sub-sample is less severe than with 
the full sample of taxpayers (see Section 1.6).44 Columns 1 and 2 report marginal effects 
evaluated at the mean – therefore making the figures relatively more comparable with the 
OLS coefficients of columns 3 and 4.  
 
                                                 
43  The two-sided Fisher’s tests to check the balance between the control and treatment group is not significant for any 
treatment. The null hypothesis is that the classification in the top turnover decile is not associated with the assignment 
into the treatment or control group.  
44  Most zero-tax filers in the baseline still report zero tax in 2015. However, some of those with a positive tax in 2015 
reported zero tax in the baseline.  
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Table 2 ITT results for CIT sample 
 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, using a T distribution with G–L degrees 
of freedom. Columns 1 and 2 report marginal effects evaluated at the mean. The dependent variable is tax due for fiscal year 
2015 in columns 1, 3, and 4; it is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the taxpayer is ‘zero-tax’ in column 2. All regressions 
include a constant, controls for size, lagged gross profit, dummies for the districts Nyarugenge and Kicukiro, as well as a dummy 
variable indicating lagged zero tax due and an interaction variable between lagged zero tax due and lagged gross profit. All 
controls are highly significant but are omitted for the sake of clarity. Reported coefficients for pooled treatments by methods 
(email, SMS, letter) and contents (public service, deterrence, reminder) result from two separate regressions where the 
disaggregated treatments are not included.  
 
The first row of Table 2 shows that the public service SMS treatment was effective both to 
reduce the number of zero-tax filers and to increase tax revenues from those with a positive 
liability. The probability of declaring zero tax decreased by four percentage points as a result 
of this SMS (column 2). Conditional on having a positive tax liability, a taxpayer in this 
treatment group declared on average RWF 3.5 million more than a taxpayer in the control 
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group (column 3). This effect is economically large, being about 44 per cent of the average 
tax due for those with positive tax liability in the control group. The public service SMS, 
concisely emphasising nation building and pride in paying taxes, was generally more 
effective than the other SMS treatments. While this message is significantly different from the 
SMS reminder in the tobit model (p-value of 0.00; column 1), it does not statistically differ in 
the OLS estimation (column 3). As far as letters are concerned, the control treatment, 
providing a simple reminder, increased reported tax by over RWF 1.1 million on average for 
the full sample (column 1) and by more than RWF 5.8 million amongst those with positive tax 
liability (column 3) – representing over 70 per cent of the average liability of non-zero tax 
taxpayers in the control group. This effect size is similar, RWF 5.6 million, when we only 
consider taxpayers with positive tax due in the baseline (column 4). Consistent with our first 
hypothesis (HP1), neither the deterrence SMS nor letter is significant.  
 
The results on emails are largely in line with those on letters, with the control email having 
the largest ITT effect of all nine treatments: almost RWF 2.7 million in the full sample (column 
1) and over RWF 10 million amongst those with positive tax liability (column 3). For email, 
the deterrence message seems to be effective, particularly amongst the sample of taxpayers 
with a positive (non-zero) tax liability – both in 2015 and in the baseline (columns 3 and 4). 
However, the coefficients for deterrence are always substantially smaller than those for the 
reminder,45 indicating that the deterrence content does not have any additional effect to 
increase compliance compared to the content of the reminder. This result is likely to be 
related more to the credibility of deterrence in a low-enforcement environment than to the 
effectiveness of actual deterrence, which has been proven highly effective in other contexts.  
 
The pooled treatments by contents show that the simple reminder is the most effective 
content.46 Deterrence is significant only in column 4 at the 10 per cent level, largely as a 
result of the significance of the deterrence email. However, its effect is smaller and 
statistically different (smaller) to the reminder. The pooled treatments by delivery method 
seem to suggest a ranking, in order of effectiveness, of emails, letters, and SMS. However, 
these coefficients are not statistically different from each other.  
 
The results of the probit model in column 2 show that, although the messages had some 
statistically significant effect in making taxpayers switch to a positive tax liability, these 
effects are relatively small. In other words, our treatments do not seem to be particularly 
effective in encouraging taxpayers to switch from a zero-tax status to a positive tax liability. 
Most of the effects we observe in the full sample come from taxpayers with a positive tax 
liability.  
 
Table 3 presents similar results to Table 2, but shows the treatment effects on compliers – 
those who effectively received the message. The LATE estimates are obtained by using an 
instrumental variable model where the original treatment assignment is an instrument for the 
actual treatment. By doing this, the LATE regression intends to estimate the causal effect on 
taxpayers who actually received the RRA notification (SMS, letter, or email) and represents 
the effect of the treatment on the compliers (Angrist and Pischke 2009). As such, we expect 
treatments to have larger effects on compliers – which is indeed the case in Table 3.  
 
Not surprisingly, the letter interventions appear much more effective in the LATE estimations, 
which is a result of the relatively high number of undelivered letters (see Section 1.5). For 
taxpayers with positive tax liability (columns 3 and 4), the letters increased declared taxes 
significantly more than the SMS, but their effect is not statistically different from that of 
emails. These findings suggest that while SMS currently constitute an effective tool to 
increase compliance, letters and emails yield higher revenue. The main challenge is related 
                                                 
45  This difference is statistically weakly significant in column 3 but not in column 4.  
46  Note that the results on pooled treatments by content and delivery method are obtained using two separate regressions 
where the disaggregated nine treatments are not included.  
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to scaling up letters, as the delivery process is particularly complex, uncertain, and 
burdensome. In the current circumstances, it seems that non-traditional delivery methods are 
more feasible and cost-effective. 
 
The results based on OLS models (column 3 and 4) can be directly compared between 
tables 2 and 3 and show a largely consistent picture. In contrast, the LATE estimates for tobit 
and probit, presented in columns 1 and 2, are not marginal effects and are therefore not 
directly comparable to the ITT coefficients, at least in terms of magnitude.47 However, they 
largely support the previous results, both in terms of the sign and statistical significance of 
the treatment variables. In particular, the public service SMS and the letter and email 
reminders remain very effective especially for taxpayers with a positive tax liability. The 
coefficients for pooled deterrence and reminder treatments are statistically significant, while 
the one for deterrence is significantly lower than the reminder one (columns 1, 3, 4) – thus 
largely confirming previous results.  
 
Finally, we can calculate the overall revenue gain obtained by the RRA thanks to our 
intervention. To do so, we use the ITT marginal effects on the full sample (column 1 of Table 
2). We first calculate the average effect of the treatments (i.e. the average value of the nine 
marginal effects). This number shows the additionally declared tax due of a taxpayer in a 
treatment group relative to a taxpayer in the control group. Then, we multiply the average 
additional tax due per taxpayer by the total number of taxpayers in our CIT treatment groups 
who declared between 1 February and 1 April (8,028 taxpayers). The goal of this calculation 
is to obtain an estimate on how much less tax would have been declared if no firm in the 
treatment group had received a message (equivalently, if all firms were in the control group). 
Given this calculation, the CIT experiment led to additional due taxes of more than RWF 6.8 
billion, which is around US$8.3 million. The additional due taxes are still around RWF 4.6 
billion (US$5.6 million) if we conservatively use only the statistically significant treatments of 
column 1 of Table 2. In relative terms, our intervention resulted in an increase in compliance 
in the range of 16.0 to 23.7 per cent.48 These revenue gains can be compared with a very 
modest cost of sending messages. A rough calculation including all costs, including 
personnel cost to coordinate message delivery, results in an estimated cost per message of 
£0.90 for letters, £0.60 for SMS, and £0.20 for emails.  
                                                 
47  The LATE coefficients do not refer to marginal effects, because we used a two-step tobit estimator, as the maximum 
likelihood tobit had difficulties in converging due to the presence of multiple endogenous variables (i.e. multiple 
treatment variables). 
48  The additional revenue is more than RWF 12 billion if we use the OLS estimation displayed in column 3 of Table 2 as 
our baseline (41.9 per cent increase in compliance among those who declared a positive tax due). 
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Table 3 LATE results for CIT sample 
 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors using a jackknife variance estimation are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
using a T distribution with G–L degrees of freedom. All columns estimate instrumental variable (IV) models. The dependent 
variable is tax due for fiscal year 2015 in columns 1, 3, and 4; it is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the taxpayer is ‘zero-
tax’ in column 2. All regressions include a constant, controls for size, lagged gross profit, dummies for the districts Nyarugenge 
and Kicukiro, as well as a dummy variable indicating lagged zero tax due and an interaction variable between lagged zero tax 
due and lagged gross profit. Reported coefficients for pooled treatments by methods (email, SMS, letter) and contents (public 
service, deterrence, reminder) result from two separate regressions where the disaggregated treatments are not included.  
 
2.1.1 Size sub-groups for CIT sample 
 
To get into further detail on our results, we explore sub-groups based on size. More 
specifically, we divide the CIT sample in two groups, including respectively the bottom 90 per 
cent according to turnover in the baseline, and taxpayers with the highest turnover (top 10 
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per cent). Reporting results on these sub-samples allows us to investigate whether our 
results differ amongst taxpayers of different size (see Section 1.2). Table 9 and Table 10 
(Appendix 1) report the results on the pooled treatments respectively for large taxpayers and 
for small and medium ones, as defined above. Not surprisingly, the treatment effects are 
much larger in monetary terms for large taxpayers, as they have higher turnovers and 
therefore pay more tax in absolute terms. Interestingly, however, the effect of the reminder is 
also larger as a proportion of tax due in the control group (with positive tax). For example, the 
additional tax due resulting from any reminder message (pooled letter, email, and SMS 
reminder treatments) is 79 per cent and 6 per cent of the average in the control group, 
respectively for large and smaller taxpayers.  
 
However, consistent with our expectations (see Section 1.2), small taxpayers responded 
more to deterrence than to other treatments. The coefficient on the pooled deterrence 
treatments is highly significant amongst smaller taxpayers, while it is only significant in the 
LATE estimation for larger ones. More importantly, it is larger and significantly different from 
the reminder (column 1), indicating that deterrence has an additional effect to the reminder 
for small taxpayers. Amongst large taxpayers, in contrast, the effect of deterrence is always 
smaller and statistically not different to a simple reminder. This suggests that smaller 
taxpayers are more likely to react to threats than larger companies, who may already be 
aware of possible fines and sanctions due to better knowledge of tax law, or access to tax 
advisers. Indeed, as a result of the deterrence messages, several taxpayers approached the 
RRA to find out more about potential fines and sanctions.  
 
As far as delivery methods are concerned, emails seem to be particularly effective for small 
taxpayers as they always yield a larger effect than other delivery methods, including letters. 
This difference is statistically significant amongst taxpayers with a positive tax liability 
(second part of the two-part tobit model even when we take into account the relatively lower 
delivery rate for letters in the LATE estimation). Although SMS yield significant increases 
amongst smaller taxpayers, they are smaller and statistically different from emails (all LATE 
estimations) and significantly different from letters (column 4 of Table 10). Similarly, letters 
(more so) and emails have generally significantly larger effects than SMS amongst large 
taxpayers.  
 
This finding, combined with the results on deterrence, could suggest that for larger taxpayers 
being approached by an RRA officer through the letter delivery is relatively more important 
than the content of the message itself, while for smaller taxpayers the combined threat of the 
content and the delivery method might be crucial. The results on all disaggregated 
treatments,49 although weaker due to a smaller sample size, confirm that the deterrence 
letter has a significant and larger effect than the letter reminder – the latter difference being 
however only significant in the tobit specification.  
 
2.2 PIT results 
 
Results for PIT are less complex than those for CIT, mostly as a result of a smaller sample. 
The number of treatments here is limited to the three message contents delivered by SMS 
(see Section 1.3). In contrast to the CIT analysis, for PIT we do not separate taxpayers 
based on turnover (top 10 per cent and bottom 90 per cent) partly because of the smaller 
sample and partly because all PIT taxpayers are relatively small, and therefore display a very 
similar behaviour across the distribution. Table 4 reports the intention-to-treat estimates for 
the PIT sample, while Table 5 reports the treatment effects on compliers based on LATE. 
Both tables report results from the tobit model on the full sample (column 1); the two parts of 
the tobit (columns 2 and 3); and those from the sub-sample of taxpayers with positive tax in 
the baseline (column 4). All regressions include control variables for lagged gross profit and 
                                                 
49  Available from the authors upon request.  
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district, a dummy variable indicating lagged zero tax due, and an interaction variable 
between lagged zero tax due and lagged gross profit.50  
 
The results for the PIT sample are in line with the previous ones. The reminder SMS seems 
to be effective particularly in the decision to pay a positive tax amount, but also for the tax 
amount – more so in the LATE estimation (Table 5). The public service SMS increased the 
tax due on average by over RWF 350,000 in the full PIT sample and by over RWF 850,000 if 
we exclude taxpayers with zero tax liability in the baseline. These effects are large, 
representing respectively 28 and 70 per cent of the average tax due for those with a positive 
liability in the control group. Consistently with the previous results on small taxpayers, the 
effect of deterrence in the PIT sample is significant – although it is always smaller than the 
public service and the reminder SMS. However, the three treatment coefficients are only 
significantly different from each other in the tobit model, both in the ITT and the LATE 
estimations. Therefore, at least amongst those with a positive tax liability, the specific content 
of the message does not seem to have an effect in addition to the pure fact of receiving any 
message from the RRA (in this case, the reminder).  
 
To estimate the additional PIT tax revenue resulting from our experimental intervention, we 
use the marginal treatment effects of the main ITT regression shown in column 1 of Table 4. 
As the three PIT treatments are jointly statistically significant, we first calculate the average 
effect of the three treatments, which gives the additionally declared tax due of a taxpayer in a 
treatment group relative to a taxpayer in the control group. We then multiply the average 
additional tax due per taxpayer by the total number of taxpayers in our PIT treatment groups 
who declared between 1 February and 1 April (1,445 taxpayers). This calculation suggests 
that our intervention led to additional due taxes of roughly RWF 316 million amongst PIT 
taxpayers, which is almost US$380,000. Taken together with the revenue gains from the CIT 
sample, the total gains from this experiment are about US$8.7 million. The additional PIT due 
is still more than RWF 292 million if we conservatively use only the two statistically significant 
treatments of column 1. On average, our SMS communication with PIT filers resulted in an 
increase in compliance of between 24.1 and 26.3 per cent.51 
 
Table 4 ITT results for PIT sample 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses (robust for columns 3 and 4). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, using a T distribution 
with G–L degrees of freedom. Columns 1 and 2 report marginal effects evaluated at the mean. The dependent variable is tax 
due for fiscal year 2015 in columns 1, 3, and 4; it is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the taxpayer is ‘zero-tax’ in column 
2. All regressions include a constant, controls for lagged gross profit, dummies for the districts Nyarugenge and Kicukiro, as well 
as a dummy variable indicating lagged zero tax due and an interaction variable between lagged zero tax due and lagged gross 
profit.  
 
 
                                                 
50  We do not include a dummy variable for size in the PIT regressions, as we did for the CIT sample, because less than 2 
per cent of PIT payers are registered at the top-medium or large taxpayers’ office. Due to the smaller sample, and 
hence lower number of districts, we do not use cluster standard errors in the PIT estimations, but White-
heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. In this case, using cluster standard errors could lead to considerably 
downward biased standard errors (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Cameron and Miller 2015).  
51  The additional revenue is more than RWF 639 million if we use the OLS estimation displayed in column 3 of Table 4 as 
our baseline (52.9 per cent increase in compliance among those who declared a positive tax due). 
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Table 5 LATE results for PIT sample 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses (robust in column 3 and 4). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1 and 3 estimate 
tobit models. Column 1 and 2 do not report marginal effects. The dependent variable is tax due for fiscal year 2015 in all 
columns except column 2, where it is a dummy for zero-tax filers. All regressions include a constant, control variables for lagged 
gross profit, dummies for the districts Nyarugenge and Kicukiro, as well as a dummy variable indicating lagged zero tax due and 
an interaction variable between lagged zero tax due and lagged gross profit.  
 
 
2.3 Discussion of results  
 
Taken together, the results presented in the previous sections allow us to draw some 
conclusions on the hypotheses we set out to explore in Section 1.2.  
 
As far as message contents are concerned, our results partially confirm hypothesis HP1 
(Section 1.2) that fiscal exchange is more effective than deterrence. Put more precisely, the 
broad result is that kind approaches to compliance (including both fiscal exchange and gentle 
reminders) can be highly effective compared to deterrence, which seems to work mainly on 
small taxpayers. Our results show that the control messages were particularly effective in 
increasing tax revenues and they generally increased tax due by a higher amount than the 
deterrence messages. Taxpayers may have perceived the control message as a polite, 
neutral, and gentle reminder of the filing period, which some may prefer over messages 
emphasising threats and even the emphasis on public services. This finding is largely driven 
by the relative success of the control message in the letter and the email treatments, and 
particularly amongst large taxpayers. For emails in particular, it is worth noting that the clear 
and straightforward subject line of the control message (‘Tax filing period open until 31st 
March 2016’) could have been more effective than the more general one of the public service 
email (‘Pay taxes. Build Rwanda. Be proud.’). However, for taxpayers with low and medium 
turnover the deterrence message was the most effective one and led to larger revenue gains 
than the reminder. This result is partly confirmed in the PIT sample, where the deterrence 
SMS also displayed a significant coefficient.  
 
Emails and letters highlighting public services seemed largely ineffective, compared to the 
public service SMS. It may be that our message had mixed effects in two different directions, 
which would contribute to the lack of significance: 1) positive for those who appreciate public 
services, and 2) negative for those who do not feel connected to nation building because of 
their political views, or who are not satisfied with the quality of public services. However, 
amongst the SMS treatments, the public service message was the most successful one. In 
the case of SMS, the public service message has a significantly higher coefficient than other 
treatments52 – indicating that the effect is due to the content, rather than the pure fact of 
receiving an SMS from the RRA. In addition to being more concise than emails and letters, 
the public service SMS did not contain a graph showing how the government spends its tax 
revenues – which could provide a possible explanation for the discrepancy in results across 
                                                 
52  This refers to the LATE estimates for CIT (Table 3). For ITT, the effect of the public service message is significantly 
higher than the control messages (p-value below 0.01), but (just) not higher than the deterrence message (p-value just 
above 0.10 except for in column 3 of Table 2). 
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delivery methods. While we expected this graph to have a positive impact on compliance, it 
could have also had an adverse effect if the displayed spending did not meet certain 
taxpayers’ expectations, preferences or needs.  
 
As far as delivery methods are concerned, our results suggest that emails and SMS can be 
highly effective to increase compliance in countries where the success of letter delivery 
cannot be ensured for many taxpayers. While the effects of pooled treatments by method in 
Table 2 show that email notifications led to higher tax than the letter treatments, the 
difference across methods is not statistically significant in the full sample. The sub-group 
analysis however suggested that emails and letters are significantly more effective than SMS 
for smaller taxpayers. Still, the SMS messages also brought about a substantial increase in 
declared taxes, especially driven by the public service SMS. Therefore, these less traditional 
delivery methods represent a cost-effective and efficient way to reach out to a large number 
of taxpayers. This result, which does not find evidence for hypothesis HP2 in Section 1.2, 
could be due to two factors. First, letters may actually have less effect than the theory might 
suggest, perhaps because of the weaker credibility of deterrence in low-enforcement 
environments. Second, the apparent weaker effect could be the result of a lower compliance 
with the letter treatments. Since we have information on the delivery status, we can 
disentangle these two effects thanks to the LATE estimation. As shown in Table 3, the 
coefficients on the email treatments are still larger than the corresponding one for letters. 
While the letters seem to increase declared taxes by a higher amount than the SMS, only the 
latter effect is statistically significant when using the full sample. In other words, the ranking 
of methods regarding the increase in the level of tax due is the same as under ITT: emails, 
letters, SMS (in descending order of effectiveness). Therefore, our results do not seem to 
support the validity of hypothesis HP2 for the case of Rwanda – and possibly low-income 
countries more generally. However, once lower compliance with the letters is taken into 
account, their effectiveness increases substantially (compare column 2 in Table 2 to column 
2 in Table 3).  
 
2.4 Robustness 
 
We test the robustness of our results to three factors in particular. The first one is outliers, 
which is particularly relevant in low-income countries like Rwanda because tax revenues are 
highly concentrated in a small group of taxpayers. Table 11 and Table 12 in Appendix 6 
report respectively the ITT and LATE results for CIT, with the top 1 per cent of observations 
in terms of tax payable (our dependent variable) capped at the 99th percentile. The results 
are largely in line with the main analysis and consistent with our conclusions. The treatment 
effects are naturally much smaller, since we are capping the largest tax payments to smaller 
amounts. Perhaps the most notable difference is that some of the deterrence messages, 
particularly emails and SMS, become significant in some regressions. However, they are not 
statistically different from the reminder. This result is consistent with the slightly larger effect 
of deterrence for smaller taxpayers in Rwanda that we showed in the sub-group analysis in 
Section 2.1.1. The corresponding results for the PIT sample are reported in Table 13 and are 
also largely consistent with the previous results.  
 
Secondly, as mentioned in Section 1.6, we did not include the lagged tax liability in our 
regressions to avoid collinearity with lagged gross profit. However, to test the robustness of 
our analysis, we add a control variable for the lagged tax liability. Table 14 and Table 15 
report respectively the ITT and LATE results for CIT, while Table 16 reports the 
corresponding results for PIT. Our results remain qualitatively similar, but some coefficients 
lose their significance. This is largely expected, as the inclusion of this variable could cause 
higher standard errors and lead to imprecise estimations of coefficients, potentially leading to 
type II errors (i.e. failure to find a treatment effect if there is an effect). In particular, the effect 
of the control letter is no longer significant in this specification. However, the control letter 
remains highly significant in the LATE analysis (see Table 15), even if we control for the 
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lagged tax due. Similarly, the PIT liability of taxpayers who received the control SMS is not 
significantly different from the control group if we include the lagged PIT liability (see Table 
16). However, the qualitative implications of the previous section remain valid, particularly as 
regards the public service SMS that remains the most effective way to approach personal 
income taxpayers.  
 
In our analysis we investigated taxpayers who declared by 1 April 2016, the deadline for 
declaring CIT and PIT for the financial year 2015. As only a small number of taxpayers filed 
income taxes between 2 April and mid-April (54 and 11 CIT and PIT filers, respectively), we 
do not expect that the inclusion of this additional period has influenced our findings. 
However, declarations in April may follow a different pattern than declarations which happen 
before the declaration deadline, for example as a result of outliers or due to different timing of 
filings of taxpayers in the treatment and control groups.53 To test the robustness of our 
results to this potential issue, we include CIT and PIT declarations that were filed after our 
experimental intervention and by 15 April 2016. Comparing the coefficients using the 
alternative time window to the results in our main analysis, our results appear robust to the 
inclusion of late filers.54  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
This paper reports the results of a large-scale field experiment on tax compliance in Rwanda, 
representing the first wave of such work ever carried out in the African continent. By doing 
this, it contributes to the literature in two main ways. First, it expands the geographical scope 
of existing evidence that so far has been almost exclusively composed of studies from high 
and middle-income countries. Second, it introduces a richer set of treatments than previous 
studies, combining message contents and delivery methods. The results provide a complex 
and nuanced picture of tax compliance in Rwanda, differentiating between small and large 
businesses, corporations and individual firms, as well as taxpayers of ‘zero-tax’ status. Our 
results confirm some of the key findings of the literature, while challenging others in a low-
income context. These results can be summarised in two main conclusions.  
 
The first broad conclusion regards drivers of compliance and what revenue authorities can 
do to make taxpayers declare their incomes in full. We find that messages which simply 
remind taxpayers of deadlines are highly effective in increasing compliance. This is in line 
with other studies that find that the fact of receiving a letter is often responsible for a large 
portion of observed treatment effects (Del Carpio 2013; Ortega and Scartascini 2016). Fiscal 
exchange also seems to be a potentially important driver of compliance, although it is only 
significant when we use SMS. At the same time, we challenge some of the existing literature 
by showing that deterrence does not seem to be an effective way to achieve large increases 
in compliance in Rwanda. This result is likely due to the credibility of deterrence ‘threats’ in a 
low-enforcement environment, rather than to the lack of effectiveness of actual deterrence 
measures. Although small taxpayers are responsive to this type of message, their 
contribution to the public purse is relatively small, and so is the increased compliance 
deriving from their response to the messages. Therefore, a friendly approach to taxpayers, 
including both information about how tax is spent and gentle reminders of deadlines, seems 
generally more effective than deterrence.  
 
                                                 
53  Among those taxpayers who filed CIT for 2015 after our experiment intervention, taxpayers who received the control 
messages filed nearly one day earlier than firms in the control group. A possible reason is the subject line of the control 
message, which is ‘Tax filing period open until 31st March 2016’ which explicitly emphasises the filing period. In 
contrast, there are no significant differences between the treatment and control group regarding the filing date in the PIT 
experiment. 
54  Results are available from the authors.  
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The second broad conclusion is related to delivery methods. Our results show that non-
traditional ways to communicate to taxpayers, such as SMS and emails, can be highly 
effective and lead to substantial increases in declared taxes. In low-income contexts, this 
finding is particularly important as governments are constantly looking for cost-effective ways 
to achieve policy goals, in the context of very limited resources. Contrary to the theoretical 
predictions, we find that emails lead to greater revenue gains, followed by letters and, finally, 
SMS. The fact that letters are delivered by tax officials does not seem to have generated a 
higher response due to an increase in the probability of detection, in contrast to related 
results in the literature (Ortega and Scartascini 2016; Doerrenberg and Schmitz 2015).  
 
Our study has clear policy implications for the Rwanda Revenue Authority and for other 
revenue administrations in low-income countries. First, our results confirm the validity of the 
RRA’s customer-oriented approach, where enforcement is accompanied by several 
measures to educate and sensitise taxpayers, as well as to facilitate the taxpaying process. 
Kind approaches seem more effective than ‘threats’ related to deterrence in Rwanda and 
potentially in low-income countries more generally, where enforcement is severely limited by 
the lack of financial and human resources. Overall, our intervention, which involved a 
relatively cheap communication strategy, generated almost US$9 million as extra tax 
revenue for the RRA, proving highly cost effective. Second, this study highlights the 
importance of incorporating rigorous evaluation in the pilot and design of new policies, from 
the early stages of implementation. By doing this, governments can focus on the measures 
that work most, without wasting resources on those that are instead of dubious effectiveness.  
 
Finally, this paper will hopefully encourage more researchers to engage in the field of tax 
experiments in low-income countries and, more broadly, in the rigorous evaluation of tax 
policies using administrative data. This is a brand new field of research in many countries, as 
such data had been largely unavailable for research purposes until recently. However, this 
study adds to a growing body of evidence showing that studies like this are feasible in low-
income countries – in addition to being much needed to generate a body of evidence that is 
globally representative.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 Treatment messages 
 
Letters and emails 
 
Kigali, on 8 January 2016   
 
RE: Tax filing period open until 31st March 2016 
 
To XXXXX, 
 
RRA would like to inform you that your CIT tax return is due by 31st March 2016. For more 
information about the filing process and payment methods, contact the call centre (3004) or 
visit the RRA website (http://www.rra.gov.rw).    
 
We would like to thank you for your collaboration and wish you a prosperous year 2016. 
 
 
 
IMPAMVU: Itariki ntarengwa yo kumenyekanisha umusoro kunyungu ni 31 Werurwe 
2016 
 
Kuri XXXXX, 
 
Ikigo cy’ Imisoro n’ Amahoro kirifuza kubamenyesha ko kumenyekanisha umisoro ku nyungu 
bikorwa bitarenze itariki ya 31 Werurwe 2016.  Ku bisobanuro birambuye byerekeye uburyo 
bwo kumenyekanisha umisoro ku nyungu bikorwa n’uburyo wishyurwa, mwahamagara 
umurongo utishyurwa 3004 cyangwa mugasura urubuga rw’ Ikigo cy’ Imisoro n’ Amahoro 
(RRA) (www.rra.gov.rw). 
 
Tubashimiye ubufatanye mudahwema kutugaragariza, tuboneyeho no kubifuriza umwaka 
mushya muhire wa 2016, uzababere uw’uburumbuke. 
 
Kind Regards/Murakoze 
 
 
 
BIZIMA RUGANINTWALI Pascal 
The Deputy Commissioner General & Commissioner for Corporate Services 
Komiseri mukuru wungirije akaba na Komiseri w’imirimo   
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Kigali, on 8 January 2016   
 
 
 
 
 
RE: Pay your taxes on time and avoid fines and penalties 
 
To XXXXX, 
 
RRA would like to inform you that your CIT tax return is due by 31st March 2016. For more 
information about the filing process and payment methods, contact the call centre (3004) or 
visit the RRA website (http://www.rra.gov.rw).    
 
Do you know that if you do not declare and pay your taxes on time, RRA can fine and 
possibly prosecute you?  
 
Pay your taxes on time and avoid fines and penalties. 
 
We would like to thank you for your collaboration and wish you a prosperous year 2016. 
 
 
 
IMPAMVU: Ishyura imisoro ku gihe, wirinde ibihano by’ubukererwe 
 
Kuri XXXXX, 
 
Ikigo cy’ Imisoro n’ Amahoro kirifuza kubamenyesha ko  kumenyekanisha umisoro ku nyungu 
bikorwa bitarenze itariki ya 31 Werurwe 2016.  Ku bisobanuro birambuye byerekeye uburyo 
bwo kumenyekanisha umisoro ku nyungu bikorwa n’uburyo wishyurwa, mwahamagara 
umurongo utishyurwa 3004 cyangwa mugasura urubuga rw’ Ikigo cy’ Imisoro n’ Amahoro 
(RRA) (www.rra.gov.rw). 
 
Wari uzi ko iyo utamenyekanishije ngo  unishyure imisoro yawe ku gihe, RRA iguca ibihano 
by’ubukererwe ikanagukurikirana mu nkiko? 
 
Ishyura imisoro yawe ku gihe, wirinde ibihano by’ubukererwe. 
 
Tubashimiye ubufatanye mudahwema kutugaragariza, tuboneyeho no kubifuriza umwaka 
mushya muhire wa 2016, uzababere uw’uburumbuke. 
 
Kind Regards/Murakoze 
 
 
 
BIZIMA RUGANINTWALI Pascal 
The Deputy Commissioner General & Commissioner for Corporate Services 
Komiseri mukuru wungirije akaba na Komiseri w’imirimo rusange 
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Kigali, on 8 January 2016   
 
 
 
 
 
 
RE: Pay taxes. Build Rwanda. Be proud  
 
To XXXXX, 
 
RRA would like to inform you that your CIT tax return is due by 31st March 2016. For more 
information about the filing process and payment methods, contact the call centre (3004) or 
visit the RRA website (http://www.rra.gov.rw).    
 
By paying your taxes you make it possible to educate our children, fund our healthcare, and 
keep us safe. 
 
Pay taxes. Build Rwanda. Be proud.  
 
We would like to thank you for your collaboration and wish you a prosperous year 2016. 
 
 
 
IMPAMVU: Ishyura imisoro. Ubaka u Rwanda. Gira ishema 
 
Kuri XXXXX, 
 
Ikigo cy’ Imisoro n’ Amahoro kirifuza kubamenyesha ko  kumenyekanisha umisoro ku nyungu 
bikorwa bitarenze itariki ya 31 Werurwe 2016.  Ku bisobanuro birambuye byerekeye uburyo 
bwo kumenyekanisha umisoro ku nyungu bikorwa n’uburyo wishyurwa, mwahamagara 
umurongo utishyurwa 3004 cyangwa mugasura urubuga rw’ Ikigo cy’ Imisoro n’ Amahoro 
(RRA) (http://www.rra.gov.rw) 
 
Iyo wishyuye imisoro yawe, ushoboza abana kwiga, uba ushyigikiye  ubuvuzi n’umutekano 
byacu.  
 
Ishyura imisoro. Ubaka u Rwanda. Gira Ishema. 
 
Tubashimiye ubufatanye mudahwema kutugaragariza, tuboneyeho no kubifuriza umwaka 
mushya muhire wa 2016, uzababere uw’uburumbuke. 
 
Kind Regards/Murakoze 
 
 
 
BIZIMA RUGANINTWALI Pascal 
The Deputy Commissioner General & Commissioner for Corporate Services 
Komiseri mukuru wungirije akaba na Komiseri w’imirimo rusange 
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SMS  
 
Deterrence:  
 
To .......... 
 
If you do not declare and pay your taxes on time, the RRA will fine and possibly prosecute 
you. Pay your taxes on time and avoid sanctions.  
 
Kuri .......... 
 
Nutamenyekanisha ngo unishyure imisoro ku gihe, RRA izaguca amande, kandi 
yanagukurikirana munkiko! Ishyura imisoro kugihe wirinde ibihano. 
 
 
Public service:  
 
To ............ 
 
By paying your taxes you make it possible to educate our children, fund our healthcare, and 
keep us safe. Pay taxes. Build Rwanda. Be proud. 
 
Kuri .......... 
 
Iyo wishyuye imisoro, uba ushyigikiye uburezi bw’abana, ubuvuzi n’umutekano byacu. 
Ishyura imisoro. Ubuka u Rwanda. Gira ishema. 
 
 
Control: 
 
To ............ 
 
Your CIT tax return is due by 31/3/16. For more information, contact the call centre (3004) or 
visit www.rra.gov.rw. 
 
Kuri .......... 
 
Itariki ntarengwa yo kumenyekanisha umusoro k’unyungu ni 31/3/2016. Kubisobanuro 
birambuye hamagara 3004 cyangwa usure www.rra.gov.rw. 
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Appendix 2 Balance checks  
 
Table 6 Balance between CIT control and treatment groups 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Real Zero tax due Large and  Gross profit Tax due 
 regime lagged top-medium lagged 
(in RWF) 
lagged 
(in RWF) 
      
      
Public service SMS, n=1059 582 
(0.80) 
612 
(0.90) 
50 
(0.35) 
100,513,876 
(0.40) 
3,116,447 
(0.32) 
Deterrence SMS, n=1060 584 
(0.77) 
611 
(0.83) 
60 
(1.00) 
82,328,246 
(0.83) 
1,113,613 
(0.51) 
Control SMS, n=1060 579 
(0.93) 
614 
(0.93) 
52 
(0.46) 
118,786,246 
(0.24) 
5,869,047 
(0.61) 
Public service letter, n=1061 575 
(0.93) 
611 
(0.80) 
64 
(0.73) 
156,547,882 
(0.08) 
13,753,107 
(0.53) 
Deterrence letter, n=1060 580 
(0.90) 
619 
(0.90) 
55 
(0.65) 
64,957,390 
(0.56) 
1,190,928 
(0.88) 
Control letter, n=1060 584 
(0.77) 
618 
(0.93) 
50 
(0.35) 
46,326,911 
(0.42) 
1,854,897 
(0.71) 
Public service email, n=1060 585 
(0.74) 
614 
(0.93) 
56 
(0.72) 
68,401,118 
(0.81) 
3,947,415 
(0.62) 
Deterrence email, n=1060 577 
(1.00) 
613 
(0.90) 
49 
(0.26) 
58,574,565 
(0.47) 
2775117 
(0.57) 
Control email, n=1060 578 
(0.97) 
610 
(0.80) 
60 
(1.00) 
92,270,919 
(0.89) 
4,275,325 
(0.41) 
      
Control group, n=1270 691 738 72 78,213,997 2,941,650 
      
Notes: n indicates the number of taxpayers in a given treatment. p-values comparing the balance between the treatment and the 
control group are shown in parentheses. For the categorical variables (columns 1 to 3), the table displays the p-value of the two-
sided Fisher’s exact test. The null hypothesis is that the classification of taxpayers (e.g. being in the real regime) is not 
associated with assignment into the treatment or control group. For the continuous variables (columns 4 to 5), we show the p-
value of the Mann-Whitney test. The null hypothesis is that the distribution of the continuous variable is the same in the 
treatment and control groups. The variable ‘large and top-medium’ refers to the RRA segmentation of taxpayers into different 
tax offices (SMTO and LTO) based on taxpayer size.  
 
 
Table 7 Balance between PIT control and treatment groups 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Real Zero tax due Large and  Gross profit Tax due 
 regime lagged top-medium lagged 
(in RWF) 
lagged 
(in RWF) 
      
      
Public service SMS, n=697 153 
(0.90) 
474 
(0.91) 
11 
(0.69) 
14,214,255 
(0.79) 
588,316 
(0.71) 
Deterrence SMS, n=698 151 
(1.00) 
221 
(0.82) 
14 
(1.00) 
14,292,145 
(0.84) 
449,512 
(0.43) 
Control SMS, n=699 151 
(1.00) 
212 
(0.45) 
16 
(0.85) 
22,685,007 
(0.40) 
813,877 
(0.14) 
      
Control group, n=699 151 226 14 18,565,437 497,053 
      
Notes: n indicates the number of taxpayers in a given treatment. p-values comparing the balance between the treatment and the 
control group are shown in parentheses. For the categorical variables (columns 1 to 3), the table displays the p-value of the two-
sided Fisher’s exact test. The null hypothesis is that the classification of taxpayers (e.g. being in the real regime) is not 
associated with assignment into the treatment or control group. For the continuous variables (columns 4 to 5), we show the p-
value of the Mann-Whitney test. The null hypothesis is that the distribution of the continuous variable is the same in the 
treatment and control groups. The variable ‘large and top-medium’ refers to the RRA segmentation of taxpayers into different 
tax offices (SMTO and LTO) based on taxpayer size.  
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Appendix 3 Variables  
 
Table 8 Summary of variables used in the regression analysis 
 
Variable 
 
 
Description 
Tax due  
(in RWF) 
 
Total tax liability for CIT and PIT for fiscal year 2015  
Treatment  
(binary) 
Binary variables indicating whether the taxpayer was in a given treatment group or 
not 
Large 
(binary) 
Binary variable that takes the value 1 if the taxpayer is registered at RRA as a large 
or top-medium firm, and zero otherwise 
Nyarugenge  
(binary) 
Binary variable reflecting location of the taxpayer in the district of Nyarugenge 
Kicukiro 
(binary) 
Binary variable reflecting location of the taxpayer in the district of Kicukiro 
Zero tax due  
(binary) 
Binary variable that takes the value 1 for firms who did not declare a positive tax 
liability in their previous tax return 
Gross profit  
(in RWF) 
Variable that reflects the lagged gross profits (i.e. business income minus the cost of 
goods and services) of firms in the real regime. The variable takes the value zero for 
firms who are in the lump-sum and flat-amount regimes  
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Appendix 4 Power calculations 
 
Figure 1 Power calculations for CIT 
 
Note: The mean value used in the power calculations is the one reported in Table 6 for the control group. The mean values on 
the vertical axis are in millions of RWF.  
 
Figure 2 Power calculations for PIT 
 
Note: The mean value used in the power calculations is the one reported in Table 7 for the control group. The mean values on 
the vertical axis are in millions of RWF.  
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Appendix 5 Results for size sub-groups 
 
Table 9 Results on pooled treatments for largest 10% 
 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses (a jackknife variance estimation is used in the LATE regressions). *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, using a T distribution with G–L degrees of freedom. All LATE rows report estimates from 
instrumental variable (IV) models. The dependent variable is tax due for fiscal year 2015 in columns 1, 3, and 4; it is a binary 
variable taking the value of 1 if the taxpayer is ‘zero-tax’ in column 2. Marginal effects are reported for ITT in columns 1 and 2 
but not for LATE. All regressions include a constant, controls for size, lagged gross profit, dummies for the districts Nyarugenge 
and Kicukiro, as well as a dummy variable indicating lagged zero tax due and an interaction variable between lagged zero tax 
due and lagged gross profit. Reported coefficients for pooled treatments by methods (email, SMS, letter) and contents (public 
service, deterrence, reminder) result from two separate regressions where the disaggregated treatments are not included.  
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Table 10 Results on pooled treatments for small and medium taxpayers (bottom 90%) 
 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses (a jackknife variance estimation is used in the LATE regressions). *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, using a T distribution with G–L degrees of freedom. All LATE rows report estimates from 
instrumental variable (IV) models. Marginal effects are reported for ITT in columns 1 and 2 but not for LATE. The dependent 
variable is tax due for fiscal year 2015 in columns 1, 3, and 4; it is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the taxpayer is ‘zero-
tax’ in column 2. All regressions include a constant, controls for size, lagged gross profit, dummies for the districts Nyarugenge 
and Kicukiro, as well as a dummy variable indicating lagged zero tax due and an interaction variable between lagged zero tax 
due and lagged gross profit. Reported coefficients for pooled treatments by methods (email, SMS, letter) and contents (public 
service, deterrence, reminder) result from two separate regressions where the disaggregated treatments are not included.  
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Appendix 6 Robustness 
 
Table 11 CIT ITT regressions with top 1% tax payments capped at 99th percentile  
 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, using a T distribution with G–L degrees 
of freedom. Columns 1 and 2 report marginal effects evaluated at the mean. The dependent variable is tax due for fiscal year 
2015 in columns 1, 3, and 4; it is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the taxpayer is ‘zero-tax’ in column 2. All regressions 
include a constant, controls for size, lagged gross profit, dummies for the districts Nyarugenge and Kicukiro, as well as a dummy 
variable indicating lagged zero tax due and an interaction variable between lagged zero tax due and lagged gross profit. All 
controls are highly significant but are omitted for the sake of clarity.  
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Table 12 CIT LATE regressions with top 1% tax payments capped at 99th percentile  
 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses, using a jackknife variance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, using a T 
distribution with G–L degrees of freedom. Columns 1 and 2 do not report marginal effects evaluated at the mean. The 
dependent variable is tax due for fiscal year 2015 in columns 1, 3, and 4; it is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the 
taxpayer is ‘zero-tax’ in column 2. All regressions include a constant, controls for size, lagged gross profit, dummies for the 
districts Nyarugenge and Kicukiro, as well as a dummy variable indicating lagged zero tax due and an interaction variable 
between lagged zero tax due and lagged gross profit. All controls are highly significant but are omitted for the sake of clarity.  
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Table 3 PIT regressions with top 1% tax payments capped at 99th percentile  
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses (robust for columns 3 and 4). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, using a T distribution 
with G–L degrees of freedom. Columns 1 and 2 report marginal effects evaluated at the mean. The dependent variable is tax 
due for fiscal year 2015 in columns 1, 3, and 4; it is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the taxpayer is ‘zero-tax’ in column 
2. All regressions include a constant, controls for lagged gross profit, dummies for the districts Nyarugenge and Kicukiro, as well 
as a dummy variable indicating lagged zero tax due and an interaction variable between lagged zero tax due and lagged gross 
profit.  
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Table 14 CIT ITT regressions controlling for lagged tax due 
 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, using a T distribution with G–L degrees 
of freedom. Columns 1 and 2 report marginal effects evaluated at the mean. The dependent variable is tax due for fiscal year 
2015 in columns 1, 3, and 4; it is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the taxpayer is ‘zero-tax’ in column 2. All regressions 
include a constant, controls for size, lagged gross profit, dummies for the districts Nyarugenge and Kicukiro, as well as a dummy 
variable indicating lagged zero tax due and an interaction variable between lagged zero tax due and lagged gross profit. All 
controls are highly significant but are omitted for the sake of clarity.  
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Table 15 CIT LATE regressions controlling for lagged tax due 
 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses, with a jackknife correction. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, using a T 
distribution with G–L degrees of freedom. Columns 1 and 2 do not report marginal effects evaluated at the mean. The 
dependent variable is tax due for fiscal year 2015 in columns 1, 3, and 4; it is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the 
taxpayer is ‘zero-tax’ in column 2. All regressions include a constant, controls for size, lagged gross profit, dummies for the 
districts Nyarugenge and Kicukiro, as well as a dummy variable indicating lagged zero tax due and an interaction variable 
between lagged zero tax due and lagged gross profit. All controls are highly significant but are omitted for the sake of clarity.  
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Table 16 PIT regressions controlling for lagged tax due 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses (robust for columns 3 and 4). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, using a T distribution 
with G–L degrees of freedom. Columns 1 and 2 report marginal effects evaluated at the mean. The dependent variable is tax 
due for fiscal year 2015 in columns 1, 3, and 4; it is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the taxpayer is ‘zero-tax’ in column 
2. All regressions include a constant, controls for lagged gross profit, dummies for the districts Nyarugenge and Kicukiro, as well 
as a dummy variable indicating lagged zero tax due and an interaction variable between lagged zero tax due and lagged gross 
profit.   
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